This article studies the relationship between debt policies of multinational companies (MNCs) and governments'tax strategies. In the …rst part, it is shown that the ability to shift income from high-to low-tax countries a¤ects MNCs'…nancial choices. In the second part we show how MNCs' …nancial decisions can a¤ect the tax strategies of two governments competing to attract income.
Introduction
The literature on multinational companies (MNCs) has gathered interesting pieces of evidence regarding both …nancing decisions and the ability to shift income from high-to low-tax jurisdictions. 1 It is well-known, indeed, that income can be shifted by means of debt policies, and that the amount of income shifted depends on tax rate di¤erentials. 2 Moreover we know that debt policies are a¤ected not only by tax factors but also by other determinants, such as distress costs and risk. 3 The aim of this article is twofold: we address both a positive and a normative point. The former regards the interactions between income shifting and debt strategies in a stochastic context. It is worth noting that so far the literature on income shifting has mainly focused on …nancial strategies in a deterministic context (see e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2003 , and Mintz and Smart, 2004) . To enrich the analysis we introduce business, default and policy risk, as well as default costs. In doing so we provide a theoretical framework which, by accounting for the above evidence, allows to better understand the e¤ects of income shifting on the …nancing strategies of a representative MNC.
The latter (normative) issue regards tax competition. We study how governments'…scal policies can be a¤ected by MNCs'strategies. In particular we analyze the behavior of two governments which compete to attract income. We then show that …nancial choices may a¤ect the equilibrium tax rates levied by the competing governments.
This article is related to two streams of literature. The …rst deals with …rms'optimal capital structure. According to this approach, optimal leverage is reached when the marginal bene…t of debt …nancing (which is due to the deductibility of interest expenses) equates its marginal cost (which is related to the expected cost of default). 4 We thus analyze the e¤ects of taxation on …nancial choices, and measure the impact of both default and policy risk on the optimal capital structure of a representative MNC. To show this we will introduce two well-known default conditions, which refer to protected debt, and unprotected debt …nancing, respectively. 5 Under protected debt …nancing default may be triggered when the …rms' asset value falls to the debt's value. Under unprotected debt …nancing the MNC has a higher degree of …nancial ‡exibility. If indeed there is a threat of default, the parent …rm could decide to convert intra-…rm debt into equity in order to prevent default. 6 Therefore, unprotected debt …nancing implies that default timing is optimally chosen by the MNC. When the subsidiary's net cash ‡ow is negative, the parent company can decide to inject further equity capital in order to meet the subsidiary's debt obligations and delay default. As long as it issues new capital and pays the interest rate it can thus exploit future recoveries in the …rm's pro…tability. 7 As pointed out by Leland (1994) both protected and unprotected debt are widely used. In particular, minimum net-worth requirements, implied by protected debt, are common in short-term debt …nancing, whereas long-term debt instruments are usually unprotected or only partially protected.
The second stream of research we refer to deals with tax competition. 8 It is worth noting that most of this literature does not deal with risk. 9 Moreover, as Wilson and Wildasin (2004, p .1084) point out, "analysis of the interaction between factor mobility, the structure of …nancial markets and institutions ... is still at an early stage". By merging the above streams we thus aim to provide a better understanding of possible interactions between MNCs'policies and governments'strategies. In particular, we show that the equilibrium tax rates of two competing governments depend on the default condition applied, namely on the characteristics of debt. We also prove that an increase in either the cost of default or the cost of income shifting raises tax rates. Moreover, we show that an increase in credibility, i.e. a lower risk of expropriation, allows governments to set higher tax rates. Finally, we …nd that 5 For a detailed analysis of debt protection see e.g. Smith and Warner (1977) . 6 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest who raised this point when reading a previous version of this article. 7 In this case, the MNC behaves as if it owned a put option, whose exercise leads to default. 8 Recent evidence on tax competition is provided by Devereux et al. (2004) . 9 A few exceptions are Gordon and Varian (1989) and Lee (2004) . See also Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006) who deal with MNCs'investment strategies and their interactions with governments'policies. both business and default risk reduce the MNC's propensity to borrow and lead to higher tax rates.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 deals with the …nancing strategies of a representative MNC, that can shift income from one country to another. Section 4 uses a two-country model to investigate how MNCs'strategies can a¤ect governments'policies. Section 5 summarises the main …ndings and derives policy implications.
The model
In this section we introduce a model describing the …nancial strategies of a representative MNC resident in country A, and owning a subsidiary located in country B. The subsidiary can borrow from a perfectly competitive credit sector, which is characterized by a given risk-free interest rate r, and by symmetric information. The following assumptions hold:
1. the parent company produces a given amount A of operating pro…ts in its home country;
2. the EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Taxes) of the foreign subsidiary, de…ned as B (t) ; follows a geometric Brownian motion
where is the instantaneous standard deviation of
, and dz B (t) is the increment of a Wiener process; 10 3. at time 0, the subsidiary borrows some resources and pays a constant coupon which cannot be renegotiated;
4. default occurs when the subsidiary does not meet its debt obligations;
5. the cost of default is proportional to the coupon received; 10 The general form of the geometric Brownian motion is
is the expected rate of growth. If shareholders are risk neutral in equilibrium we have = r ; where r is the risk-free interest rate and is the convenience yield (see e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 1985) . With no loss of generality, in (1) we set = r = 0:
6. the MNC believes that there is some positive probability dt that the foreign government expropriates its subsidiary during the short interval dt.
The above assumptions deserve some comments. Assumption 1 states that the operating pro…ts of the parent company ( A ) are exogenously given, whereas, according to Assumption 2, the subsidiary's EBIT is stochastic. These two hypotheses allow us not only to analyze the e¤ects of foreign business risk on the parent company in a tractable way, 11 but also to account for the fact that MNCs are an important channel for the transmission of country-speci…c shocks. 12 In line with Leland (1994) , Assumption 3 entails that the MNC sets a coupon and then computes the market value of debt. In the absence of arbitrage, this is equivalent to …rst set, the value of debt and then, compute the e¤ective interest rate under the non-arbitrage condition. For simplicity we also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated. 13 Assumption 4 introduces the risk of default for the subsidiary. Given (1), it is assumed that if the subsidiary'EBIT falls to a given threshold value, the subsidiary is expropriated by the lender, and the parent company becomes a domestic …rm with a gross cash ‡ow equal to A : As we pointed out in the introduction we will use the following alternative de…nitions of default.
14 De…nition 1 Under protected debt …nancing, default takes place when B falls to an exogenously given threshold point According to De…nition 1, default may be triggered when the subsidiary's payo¤ falls to the exogenously given threshold point p B : The second de…n-ition regards unprotected debt. This condition implies that default timing 11 If both A and B were stochastic, the MNC's overall pre-tax operating pro…t ( A + B ) would not follow the Markov Properties. Thus we would fail to obtain a closed-form solution. 12 As shown by , rates of return and investment rates of a¢ liates are highly correlated with the rates of return and investment of the a¢ liate's parent and other a¢ liates within the same group. 13 For an analysis of debt renegotiation see e.g. Goldstein et al. (2001) . 14 For further details on default conditions see Smith and Warner (1977) , and Leland (1994) . For a study of corporate taxation under default risk see also Panteghini (2004 Panteghini ( , 2006 . is optimally chosen by the MNC. When the subsidiary's net cash ‡ow is negative, indeed the parent company can decide to inject equity and exploit future recoveries in the subsidiary's payo¤.
In the event of default, the lender faces a sunk cost, which is proportional to the coupon paid (Assumption 5). It is worth noting that the quality of results does not change if we assume that the cost of default is proportional to the …rm value, rather than to the debt value.
Finally, Assumption 6 describes the MNC's beliefs on the credibility of future government policy. In particular, it is assumed that the MNC fears that the foreign government may expropriate its subsidiary. Since such an expropriation is a sudden event, we model policy risk as a Poisson process, where dt is the instantaneous a priori probability that expropriation occurs in the short interval dt.
Let us next introduce taxation. For simplicity we assume that the tax system is fully symmetric and follows the source principle. 15 We also assume that the MNC can shift a percentage A of the coupon paid by the foreign subsidiary. However, shifting income by means of intra-…rm borrowing and lending is costly. The cost of income shifting is due to two main factors: one is related to advising activities and the other is due anti-avoidance rules. On the one hand, shifting income usually requires the costly advice of tax and …nancial experts. On the other hand, countries aim to prevent taxavoiding practices by introducing ad hoc rules, such as thin capitalization and Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules. 16 The cost function ( A ) we use is convex in A :
17 De…ning A and B as the tax rate of country A and B, respectively, we can write the overall pro…t function of the MNC as (2) is a¤ected by the transmis- 15 Notice that the existence of deferral possibilities and limited credit rules leads to the application of the source principle (see e.g. Keen, 1993) . 16 For further details on this point see Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) . 17 In line with Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006) we assume that the cost of income shifting is non deductible. See also Hau ‡er and Schjelderup (2000) for a discussion on this point.
sion of country B's shock. Manipulating (2) one obtains
where e B + ( A ) is the e¤ective tax bene…t arising from the deduction of the coupon. As can be seen, e accounts for the net bene…t of income shifting, i.e.
. A trade-o¤ arises from debt …nancing. On the one hand, interest deductibility ensures a tax bene…t. On the other hand, debt may cause default. Such a trade-o¤ will then induce the MNC to choose the subsidiary's optimal leverage ratio. Since the tax bene…t e depends on income reporting strategies, i.e. on ( A ), it will then be straightforward to show that …nancial choices are a¤ected by tax shifting activities.
With no loss of generality we assume that ( A ) is a quadratic function, i.e.
where n 0 measures how costly it is for the MNC to shift income from one country to the other. If thus n goes to zero, the …rm can shift pro…t at no cost. If, instead, n goes to in…nity, income shifting is too costly. As we pointed out, the cost of income shifting is due to institutional determinants as well as to tax and …nancial advising activities. In particular, the introduction of thin capitalization and CFC devices, aiming to prevent tax avoiding activities, raises n. Moreover the decrease in the cost of tax sheltering operations, which is linked to the degradation of book and tax pro…ts, 18 leads to a decrease in n. The MNC's income shifting problem is thus as follows
Solving (3) we obtain the optimal level of income shifting
As shown in (4), the optimal percentage of income shifted is reached when the marginal gain in terms of tax savings, here expressed by tax rate di¤erential ( B A ), is equal to the marginal cost of income shifting. 19 If therefore A > B the …rm shifts income from country A to country B and vice versa.
20
Substituting (4) into (3) we have
3 The MNC' s capital structure
The framework so far obtained accounts for interesting characteristics of MNCs, such as the use of debt for tax-motivated income reporting strategies, under business, default and policy risk. In this section we show how these features may a¤ect the …nancing strategies of the representative MNC. For simplicity, hereafter we will omit the time variable t. In order to …nd the MNC's optimal capital structure, we must …rst compute the value function
where
are the value of debt and equity, respectively. Let us …rst calculate the value of debt, under the assumption that, before default, the lender is tax exempt. 21 When, in the event of default, the lender becomes shareholder, however, it is subject to the source-based tax levied on the subsidiary. According to Assumption 5, moreover, we set the cost of default equal to C B , where the parameter > 0 measures the impact of default on the lender's pro…tability. 19 The fact that statutory tax rates are a fairly important factor that in ‡uences income shifting decisions is well supported by empirical …ndings. On this point see e.g. Hines (1999), , and Mills and Newberry (2004) . 20 In our model the optimal percentage of income shifting A is not state contingent. This symplifying assumption implies that the choice of A a¤ects the MNC's …nancial decisions but does not depend on such decisions. 21 It is well-known that e¤ective tax rates on capital income are fairly low. With no loss of generality we thus assume that the lender's pre-default tax burden is nil.
The debt value
Given the default threshold point j B ; the value of debt is thus equal to (see Appendix A)
As shown in (7), the value of debt accounts for the risk of expropriation (i.e. parameter ). In line with Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we account for this risk as follows: we regard the lender's claim as an in…nitely-lived one, but we raise the discount rate from r to (r + ) :
consists of two terms. The …rst one,
, is a perpetual rent computed with the augmented discount rate (r + ). The second term accounts for any future expected change in pro…tability caused by default. In particular, the term
measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the event default. After default, the lender becomes shareholders and the value of her claim is
; with j = p; u.
The equity value
Let us next compute the value of equity. According to Assumption 4, when default occurs the parent company loses its subsidiary and receives a net operating pro…t equal to (1 A ) A : Thus the value of equity is simply equal to the perpetual rent
22 Before default, the MNC must account for the risk of expropriation of its subsidiary. As shown in Appendix B, therefore, we have
where f p p B = 0 and f
The term
measures the net bene…t arising from the ownership of the subsidiary. As can be seen, this term is equal to the present value of the net cash ‡ow with discount rate (r + ) : The term f u u B measures the value of …nancial ‡exibility under unprotected debt …nancing. As we pointed out, the MNC has opportunity to inject equity (or, equivalently, convert intra-debt into equity) in order to delay default and exploit future tax avoidance bene…ts, as well as any recovery in the subsidiary's pro…tability.
We can now compute the default threshold points under protected and unprotected debt …nancing. According to De…nition 1, protected debt …-nancing means that the default threshold point p B is exogenously given. We assume that p B is such that the MNC's overall pro…t is nil, i.e.
Let us next compute the threshold value under unprotected debt …nanc-ing. Following Leland (1994) , u B is obtained by maximizing the value of equity, i.e. max
Substituting (8) into (10) we can compute the MNC's default trigger point (see Appendix B)
As can be seen, the threshold points p B and u B are proportional to the coupon paid, and are instead independent of the current EBIT. 23 The quality of results does not change if we assume a di¤erent threshold value.
Comparing (9) with (11) it is straightforward to show that, coeteris paribus, the inequality u B < p B holds. Under unprotected debt …nancing, the MNC can inject equity in order to meet the subsidiary's debt obligations. This means that, relative to the protected case, the MNC postpones default.
Moreover, it is easy to show that
: Such a di¤erence is due to the fact that under unprotected debt …nancing, the MNC is endowed with a put option (i.e. the option to default). This makes the claim more valuable. 24 Let us analyze the e¤ects on tax avoidance on the default threshold points. It is straightforward to show that whenever tax avoidance is allowed we have e > B , and the inequality 1 e 1 B < 1 thus holds. Given (9) and (11), therefore, we can write the following:
Lemma 1 Tax avoidance leads to a postponement of delay.
The optimal coupon
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) we obtain the overall value of the MNC
(12) Using (12) we can now …nd the optimal coupon. As shown by Leland (1994) , the optimal coupon is the solution of the following problem:
Solving (13) we obtain the optimal coupon (Appendix C) 24 Given the inequality
we might wonder why …rms use protected debt as well. In fact unprotected debt would be preferable for shareholders. As pointed out by Leland (1994) , protected debt may be preferred if agency costs are assumed. In particular protected debt may induce shareholders not to increase …rm risk at the expense of the lender. However this point is beyond the scope of our article. 25 The maximization of the MNC's overall value (including debt) implicitly rules out any agency con ‡ict between shareholders and the lender. As pointed out in the previous footnote, strategic interactions, à la Myers (1977) , are not deal with in this article. 
with
:
It is straightforward to show that
. Under unprotected debt …nancing the MNC can decide when to default. Its higher ‡exibility thus allows the MNC to raise leverage.
As shown in (14) , C j B is proportional to the current EBIT, B , and is also a¤ected by taxation. It is easy to ascertain that Let us next analyze the impact of income shifting on the capital structure. We can prove the following:
Lemma 2 If A 6 = B a decrease in n raises the optimal coupon C B .
Proof-See Appendix D. The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward: a reduction in the cost of income shifting encourages tax avoidance, and thus raises the tax bene…t of debt …nancing. Such an increase stimulates the issue of debt and thus induces the MNC to pay a higher coupon.
Let us next analyze the e¤ects of risk on the MNC's debt strategy. Given the above results we can write the following Lemma 3 If is low enough, then
Proof-See Appendix E. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. If the cost of default is low enough, an increase in reduces the ratio
In line with Leland (1994) , indeed, an increase in volatility makes the costly event of default more likely and thus discourages debt …nancing. 27 Moreover, an increase in
. This is due to the fact that a rise in increases the discount rate (r + ). Thus the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the event of default is reduced. The decrease in the expected cost of default induces the MNC to borrow more resources (or, equivalently, to pay a higher coupon). As regards unprotected debt, the quality of results does not change. 28 We have thus provided a rationale for the positive e¤ect of policy risk on debt …nancing, which has been found (but not explained) by .
To have a better idea of the above e¤ects we run a numerical simulation of 2001), and set = 0:05: It is worth noting that such a value is lower than those usually assumed in the relevant literature. 29 Setting r = 0:045 and focusing on protected debt we thus obtain the results depicted in Fig. 1 .
Despite the use of a fairly low value of ; results are in line with Lemma 3: both an increase in and a decrease in raise the ratio 
The competitive equilibrium
In this section we model tax competition between two small open countries, called A and B: We assume that, in each country, there exists a MNC which owns a foreign subsidiary and chooses its optimal capital structure. We thus use the MNC studied in the previous section, de…ned as MNC A, and then add a second MNC, named MNC B, with headquarter in country B, and a 27 As we pointed out in the introduction this result is in line with the empirical …ndings of Fan et al. (2003) . 28 In order for the derivative Using the notation of Section 3, we de…ne B as the …rm's operating pro…t earned in country B (i.e. in MNC B's home country), and C j A as the coupon paid to the lender. Moreover, A is the stochastic EBIT faced by the subsidiary, which is driven by the geometric Brownian motion 
Given the above assumptions, we have two country-speci…c shocks: namely the shock faced by MNC A when investing in country B and the one faced by MNC B when investing in country A. 30 Let us next compute the governments'objective functions, under the assumption that 100% of the MNC resident in the home country is held by domestic households. 31 Moreover we assume that, despite MNCs' beliefs regarding policy risk, governments do not aim to expropriate foreign subsidiaries. Therefore the governments'objective functions do not embody the value of the foreign subsidiary, and are thus equal to the value of the resident MNC plus the present value of net tax revenues. The government A's objective function consists of …ve terms:
1. the value of equity of its resident MNC, i.e.
2. the present value of tax revenues gathered from the resident MNC, which is equal to the perpetual rent
3. the present value of taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary: since taxes are paid irrespective of the …rm's ownership, they are not contingent 30 The quality of results does not change if we assume that these two shocks are correlated. 31 Such a home-bias is well documented in the literature. However some recent articles have shown that it has declined over the last decade (see e.g. Sørensen et al., 2005) . 32 By symmetry, the equity value of MNC B is E 
5. the net loss of revenues due to income shifting from the parent company placed in B and its subsidiary operating in A, A B C j A ; the present value of this net ‡ow is (see Appendix F)
As can be seen, both (17) and (18) are conditional on the event of default. This is due to the fact that, whenever default takes place, debt turns into equity. Since the lender becomes shareholder, any tax bene…t due to debt …nancing vanishes.
Adding the above terms, we obtain the government A's objective function 
Following the same procedure we also obtain the government B's objective function.
34 33 Notice that the governments do not account for the costs of pro…t shifting. 34 Using the same notation we obtain government B's welfare function:
Each government maximizes the welfare function,
The maximization of (20) is part of a sequential game, where at stage 1 the governments set the tax rates, and at stage 2 the two MNCs will decide both their debt-equity ratio and the percentage of income shifting. Solving (20) we can prove the following:
Proposition 1 If n is low enough, a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium tax rate (0; 1] exists. The equilibrium tax rate under protected debt …nancing is higher than that obtained under unprotected debt …nancing.
Proof See Appendix G.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. The equilibrium tax rate is (0; 1] on condition that n is low enough, i.e. income shifting is pro…table enough.
The e¤ect of default conditions on the equilibrium tax rates can be explained as follows. As we pointed out in Section 3, we have C u B > C p B : Since under unprotected debt …nancing the …rm's leverage is higher, for any given percentage of income shifted k ; tax avoidance ensures a greater bene…t. Relative to the protected-debt case, therefore, the governments are thus obliged to decrease tax rates in order to reduce such a tax bene…t. As a consequence, the equilibrium tax rate under unprotected debt …nancing is lower. Proposition 1 is obtained by assuming that the objective function does not account for all the …rm's value but only for equity value. However, it is easy to prove the following:
The equilibrium tax rate is unchanged if the objective function also accounts for the value of debt.
Proof See Appendix H.
Corollary 1 shows that the result of Proposition 1 is una¤ected by the change in the governments'objective functions. The intuition behind Corollary 1 is straightforward: as the credit market is perfectly competitive, all pro…ts accrue to shareholders. Therefore adding the value of debt to the objective function does not increase the relevant tax base. The equilibrium tax rate is thus unchanged.
Let us next provide some comparative statics regarding . We …rst analyze the impact of the default and the income shifting costs. We can prove the following:
Proposition 2 An increase in either the cost of default (i.e. in ) or the cost of shifting income (i.e. n) causes an increase in :
Proof See Appendix I.
As shown in Proposition 2 both the distress and the income shifting cost have a positive impact on the equilibrium tax rates. An increase in raises the expected cost of default and thus discourages the use of debt. Coeteris paribus, a rise in reduces the optimal coupon and, given k ; the amount of income shifted from one country to the other. By discouraging income shifting, the increase in allows the competing governments to reach a higher equilibrium tax rate. This result has an interesting implication: both default procedures and debtors' protection rights (à la La Porta et al., 1997) can a¤ect governments'…scal strategies.
A similar reasoning holds for n. An increase in n makes income shifting more costly: this allows the governments to set a higher . This result has an interesting policy implication: as long as governments can a¤ect the value of n; e.g. by means of more stringent anti-avoidance rules (such as thin capitalization and CFC rules), they can set a higher tax rate. This helps to explain the widespread introduction of these devices throughout the world. On the other hand, both the di¤usion of sophisticated …nancial engineering activities and the decrease in tax consulting expenses may cause a reduction in n, and therefore lead to a decrease in .
Let us next analyze the impact of and on the equilibrium tax rate. Like in Fig. 1 we focus on the protected-debt case. Using the same parameter values of the case depicted in Fig. 1 (i. e. = 0:05; r = 0:045, n = 0:5) we show that an increase in leads to a decrease in the equilibrium tax rate. The intuition behind this result is as follows: an increase in stimulates borrowing, and thus raises the ratio ; with k = A; B: Given the optimal percentage k , therefore, a greater amount of income can be shifted. In order to o¤set the increase in income shifting opportunities, governments are thus induced to set lower tax rates.
This result has an interesting policy implication: an increase in credibility, i.e. a lower value of , allows governments to set higher tax rates. In this model we have used an one-shot game and assumed the absence of any debt renegotiation. If we enriched the framework by assuming a repeated game between governments and by allowing MNCs to renegotiate debt, we then would expect a positive relationship between reputation and the level of tax rates. 35 As shown in the previous Section, an increase in discourages borrowing, and thus reduces the ratio
Coeteris paribus, therefore, income shifting is discouraged, and the governments can set higher tax rates (see Fig. 3 ). The quality of results does not change if we focus on unprotected debt …nancing.
Let us …nally compare the last result with Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006) , who show that an increase in volatility discourages FDIs and thus reduces the overall number of multinational …rms. In their case, the policy response is therefore to lower the tax rate in order to alleviate the negative impact of increased volatility. In this model, however, we analyze MNCs' strategies when FDI has already been undertaken and income can be shifted by means of debt …nancing. This explains the di¤erent results obtained.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this article we have studied the interactions between …nancial policies and income shifting activities of MNCs in a stochastic environment. In the …rst part we have shown that income shifting both 1) raises the tax bene…t of debt …nancing, thereby stimulating debt …nancing, and 2) delays default.
In the second part of the article we have analyzed the impact of MNCs' strategies on the behavior of two competing governments. In line with Wilson and Wildasin's (2004), we have studied how the structure of …nancial markets and institutions may matter in terms of …scal policies. We have therefore shown that the characteristics of debt …nancing can a¤ect the governments' strategies. In particular the equilibrium tax rate is lower under unprotected debt …nancing than under protected debt …nancing.
Moreover, we have found that an increase in either the cost of default or the cost of income shifting raises the equilibrium tax rate. These results have some interesting policy implications. First of all, the cost of default may a¤ect governments'tax strategies. In particular, both default procedures and debtors'protection rights are expected to a¤ect governments'…scal strategies. Also, more stringent anti-avoidance devices, such as thin capitalization and CFC rules, allow governments to set higher tax rates.
Finally, we have shown that risk has an ambiguous impact on governments' strategies. On the one hand, policy risk (related to MNCs' beliefs that governments may expropriate foreign activities) reduces the equilibrium tax rate. On the other hand, an increase in both business and default risk leads to higher tax rates.
There are at least two topics that still need to be looked at. First of all, here we have assumed that tax rates are the only policy tool in the hand of the two competing governments. A natural extension of the model would then be the introduction of a second policy tool regarding the tax base. Secondly, this article proposes some testable hypotheses regarding the interactions between MNCs'activities and governments'policies. These …ndings are left for future empirical investigation.
A Derivation of (7) Using dynamic programming, debt can be written as 
Applying Itô's Lemma to (22) , one obtains
The general closed-form solution of function (23) is
where 1 and 2 are, respectively, the positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation pre-default value of debt must be equal to the post-default one, net of the default cost. Using the two branches of (24) we thus obtain
Solving for D j 2 yields
Given the above results it is straightforward to obtain (7).
B Derivation of (8) and (11) To derive the value of equity we must remember that default causes an expropriation of the subsidiary. This means that whenever we have B = j B , the value of equity reduces to
that is the fair value of the parent company when operating as a domestic …rm.
Applying dynamic programming we next write the added value due to the ownership of a foreign subsidiary. Given the additional after-tax cash ‡ow due to holding the subsidiary, i.e. Y N A ( B ) (1 A ) A ; the added value is equal to
As can be seen (26) embodies the net bene…t arising from income shifting, and accounts for the risk of expropriation (i.e. the MNC's fear that the government expropriates its subsidiary). Using Itô's Lemma, eliminating all the terms multiplied by (dt) 2 and dividing by dt, we can rewrite (26) as
( B ) ; (27) where
: Solving (27) we have
Let us next compute A Solving for A j 2 thus yields
The pre-default value of equity is thus equal to
with j = p; u:
B.1 Equity value under protected debt
Recall that under full debt protection, we have
In this case we have therefore A p 2 = 0; and the value of equity reduces to
B.2 Equity value under unprotected debt
Under unprotected debt, instead, the MNC must solve (10) . Using (29) one obtains the following f.o.c.
(1 e ) C (
(31) Finally, using (30) and (31) one easily obtains (8) .
C The optimal coupon
Let us solve problem (13) . Using (12) and di¤erentiating with respect to C 
Substituting (9) and (11) into (33) yields (14) .
D Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 1, let us apply a log-transform to (14) log < 0 for A 6 = B ; we thus have
The Lemma is thus proven.
E Proof of Lemma 3
Taking the log of (14) and di¤erentiating with respect to 2 and we obtain
and @ log
< 0, and
if is high enough. This is su¢ cient to obtain
As regards unprotected debt it is worth noting that the term
is positive. Therefore we need a lower value of for the derivative
to be positive. This proves the Lemma.
F Derivation of (17) and (18) Let us compute the present value of the net loss of revenues due to income shifting from the parent company placed in A and its subsidiary operating in B. Given the current ‡ow 
holds. Substituting (38) into the condition (39) it is easy to obtain (17) . Following the same procedure we can compute the present value of the net loss of revenues due to pro…t shifting from the parent company placed in B and its subsidiary operating in A (18) .
G Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1 let us focus on the decision of the government A. Substituting (19) into (20) and di¤erentiating the objective function with 38 Remember that N B ; and
Under symmetry we have k = e = ; 
G.2 Unprotected debt
If debt is unprotected equation (41) Using (8) and (14) we thus have Using (45) we thus obtain
It is thus easy to ascertain that R u (0) = 0;
@R u ( ) @ > 0 for 0; and lim !1 R u ( ) = 1: Moreover we know from (46) that R u ( ) > R p ( ) : This entails that the equality R u ( ) = 1 holds for a lower value of . As a consequence, the equilibrium tax rate is lower under unprotected debt …nancing. This concludes the proof.
H Proof of Corollary 1
To prove Corollary 1 let us add the value of debt (i.e. (7)) to the objective function (19) The e¤ect of an increase in n and/or on the equilibrium tax rate .
As can be seen eq. (49) collapses to (41). This is su¢ cient to prove that the equilibrium tax rate is the same as that obtained in Proposition 1. The Corollary is thus proven. .
I Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 let us recall (43). It is easy to show that @R( ) @ < 0; and @R( ) @n < 0: This e¤ect is depicted in Fig. 5 . As can be seen, an increase in either or n shifts curve R ( ) downwards.
Therefore the equilibrium tax rate increases from 0 to 1 . A similar result can be obtained under unprotected debt …nancing. According to Proposition 1, however, the equilibrium tax rate is lower than that obtained in the protected-debt case. This concludes the proof.
